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The crop insurance industry enjoyed another banner year in 2007, collecting $6.5 billion 
in premiums yet paying out only 
$3.2 billion in losses. I estimate that 
the industry will collect a record 
$2.8 billion from taxpayers. In con-
trast, the net amount that farmers 
received from the program in 2007 
was only $750 million. Interestingly, 
since the beginning of this decade, 
the $11.3 billion in net payments to 
farmers (indemnities received mi-
nus farmer-paid premiums) is about 
equal to the amount that taxpayers 
have paid the industry ($11.1 bil-
lion). Overall, taxpayers have spent 
more than $22 billion since 2000 
delivering about $11 billion in net 
payments to farmers, making crop 
insurance one of the least-effi cient 
means by which taxpayers support 
the farm sector.
The scale of this ineffi ciency is 
well known to regular readers of this 
Review. What is diffi cult to under-
stand is why the program persists in 
its present form when more effi cient 
risk management programs could 
be adopted in the farm bill. One 
explanation is that campaign contri-
butions from crop insurance com-
panies and agents have persuaded 
key members of Congress to support 
continuation of the program. An al-
ternative explanation is that farmers 
in certain regions excessively benefi t 
from the program and that members 
from these regions are protecting 
the interests of their farmers. Sup-
port for this hypothesis comes from 
Senator Roberts from Kansas and 
Senator Conrad from North Dakota 
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who have argued that reform of 
the crop insurance program threat-
ens the viability of the program in 
those regions that depend most 
heavily on insurance payments. 
Specifi cally, they worry that a drop 
in crop insurance participation 
by Corn Belt farmers might force 
farmers in higher risk areas to pay 
more for insurance.
Implicit in this worry is the 
assumption that industry profi ts 
generated by Corn Belt farmers 
allow farmers in other regions to 
pay lower insurance premiums 
than they would have to pay oth-
erwise. If this is true, then if Corn 
Belt farmers dropped out of the 
program, other regions would suf-
fer. An examination of recent crop 
insurance data offers support for 
this conjecture.
Experience with Crop Insurance 
Since 2000
Participation in the crop insurance 
program was given a large boost 
with passage of increased premi-
um subsidies that were included in 
the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protec-
tion Act. Since that time, 
farmers have had to pay 
a bit less than half the 
amount that USDA’s Risk 
Management Agency 
(RMA) has determined is 
needed to cover insured 
crop losses. This amount 
is called the actuarially 
fair premium. The large 
premium subsidy means 
that if all farmers pay 
actuarially fair premiums 
then the ratio of indemni-
ties received (crop losses 
covered) to farmer-paid 
premium should equal two. While 
the period since 2000 in looking 
at crop losses is too short a time 
to judge actuarial fairness of crop 
insurance premiums, it is instruc-
tive to see if there is a discernible 
geographic pattern to the ratios 
since 2000. 
As shown in Figure 1 on page 2, 
Great Plains states all have ratios 
greater than 2.0 while farmers in 
the fi ve Corn Belt states all have ra-
tios less than 2.0. This shows that 
farmers in the Great Plains have 
benefi ted far more than have Corn 
Belt farmers from crop insurance. 
Note that Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa 
all have ratios less than 1.0. This 
means that farmers in these three 
states have paid more dollars in 
premiums than have been returned 
to them in indemnities. That is, far 
from receiving subsidized premi-
ums, Corn Belt farmers have, in 
fact, been paying more into the 
program than they have gotten in 
return.
Another way of looking at 
the distribution of crop insur-
ance payments is to simply add 
up premiums paid and indemni-
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ties received. As shown in Figure 
2, Texas, Kansas, North Dakota, 
and South Dakota have all re-
ceived more than $1 billion in net 
payments since 2000. In contrast, 
farmers in Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa 
together paid $750 million more in 
premiums than they have received 
from the program. Clearly, the recent 
experience in crop insurance suggests 
that Corn Belt farmers are paying too 
much in premiums, and Great Plains 
Figure 2. Total indemnities received minus farmer-paid premiums from 
2000 to 2007
Figure 1. Ratio of total indemnities received to farmer-paid premiums 
from 2000 to 2007
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farmers (among others in the country 
not shown) are paying too little.
Corn Belt Contributions to 
Industry Profi ts
Each year, the crop insurance 
program allows companies to keep 
some of the gains in states where 
premiums exceed losses in ex-
change for taking on some of the 
risk in states where losses exceed 
premiums. The program also al-
lows companies fl exibility in choos-
ing how much of the gain or loss 
they want to keep in each state. 
Companies have learned to keep 
as much of the risk as possible in 
the Corn Belt states and to give the 
government as much of the risk as 
possible in higher-risk states. Thus, 
it should come as no surprise that 
much of the net underwriting gains 
paid to companies are generated in 
the Corn Belt states.
Total underwriting gains paid 
to the crop insurance industry 
range from -$52 million in 2002 to 
an estimated $1.5 billion in 2007. To 
estimate the contribution to these 
gains that the Corn Belt made, pre-
miums and losses were calculated 
each year for the top fi ve corn 
and soybean states: Iowa, Illinois, 
Minnesota, Indiana, and Nebraska. 
Underwriting gains for each state 
were then calculated using the 
rules laid out in the Standard Re-
insurance Agreement. The results 
are shown in Figure 3.
In almost every year, more than 
50 percent of the underwriting 
payments to crop insurance com-
panies were generated by just two 
crops in fi ve states. Since 2000, 67 
percent of total underwriting gains 
have been generated by corn and 
soybeans in these fi ve states, even 
though these state-crop combina-
tions generated only 32 percent 
of the premiums. Adding under-
writing gains to the 32 percent of 
administrative and operating sub-
sidies that are paid to the compa-
nies, it’s easy to conclude that corn 
and soybean insurance in just fi ve 
states generates 50 percent of the 
revenue to the crop insurance in-
dustry and most of its profi ts. From 
this perspective it is clearly true 
that if Corn Belt farmers left the 
program, then offering insurance 
to farmers in the other parts of the 
country would be much less attrac-
tive to the industry.
Is Corn Belt Insurance Overrated?
Excessive profi ts insuring Corn 
Belt farmers must imply that Corn 
Belt insurance premiums are too 
high relative to the risks covered. 
Before we can conclude that crop 
insurance premiums on corn and 
soybeans are too high in the Corn 
Belt, we must consider the repre-
sentativeness of growing conditions 
from 2000 to 2007. Overall, the re-
cent experience in the Corn Belt is 
likely more favorable than what can 
be expected over any eight-year 
period. Although there were region-
al droughts that affected yields in 
2002 and 2005, there has not been 
a widespread drought in the Corn 
Belt since 1988. Furthermore, the 
mechanism by which crop insur-
ance rates are adjusted is based 
on a rolling 25-year average of 
losses within each state. The recent 
good experience in the Corn Belt 
is slowly making itself felt in lower 
premium rates for farmers.
However, there is good evidence 
that production risks are falling 
much faster than crop insurance 
rates can adjust because of rapid ad-
vances in technology, especially for 
corn. The recently approved Biotech 
Yield Endorsement reduces crop 
insurance rates for Corn Belt farm-
ers who plant certain biotech seeds. 
This program demonstrates that 
modern corn hybrids are less risky 
than assumed by RMA rate-making 
methods. Today’s corn is much bet-
ter able to withstand insect infes-
tations, late-season wind damage, 
excess moisture, and extended dry 
conditions than corn that was plant-
ed 20 years ago. Approval of simi-
lar endorsements will be needed 
to bring Corn Belt insurance rates 
more in line with risks. 
Alternative Means of Insuring 
Corn Belt Risks
The crop insurance industry argues 
that it needs to generate large un-
derwriting gains in favorable years Figure 3. Where are the underwriting gains generated?
Continued on page 11
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Market prognosticators and fund managers who invest in corn and soybean futures 
in the winter and spring would have 
us believe that they have inside in-
formation about where markets are 
headed. But nobody can know what 
the price of corn will be for the 2008 
crop because so many of the fac-
tors that will determine corn prices 
cannot be known at this time. We 
know that the 2008 corn yield will 
have a direct effect on corn prices, 
but 2008 growing conditions cannot 
be predicted. Other unpredictable 
factors that will affect the price of 
corn include the demand for corn 
from the ethanol industry, the value 
of the dollar, the supply of crops 
in other countries, and the overall 
level of world economic activity.  
Predictors of corn prices and 
corn price variability can be ob-
tained from futures and option pric-
es on the Chicago Board of Trade. 
For example, if the December 2008 
futures price is $6.00 per bushel, 
then we know that traders think 
there is about a 50 percent chance 
that prices will below $6.00 and a 
50 percent chance that price will 
be above $6.00. But futures prices 
give us no information about how 
far prices could fall or how much 
they could increase. For that infor-
mation, we look at options prices. If 
the price of an “at the money” put or 
call option is $0.70 per bushel, then 
we know from Black’s theory of op-
tion prices that the volatility of the 
futures price is about 30 percent. 
What this means is that the mar-
ket suggests there is a 15 percent 
chance that the December futures 
The Outlook for Corn Prices in the 2008 Marketing Year
price will fall below $4.20 and a 15 
percent chance that the price will 
be higher than $7.80. Thus, we know 
from observing trades in Chicago 
that the market suggests there is a 
70 percent chance that the future 
price will be between $4.20 and 
$7.80 per bushel. 
But what will happen to corn 
prices if a major drought hits this 
year or if Congress decides to relax 
ethanol mandates? Estimating the 
impacts of such events requires 
development of a computer model 
of the corn market. Such a model 
needs to include basic supply and 
demand relationships, such as the 
demand for feed and the level of 
planted acreage, but it also needs 
to account for the unknowable: 
the national corn yield, the level of 
export demand, and future gasoline 
prices. 
To answer these types of “what 
if” questions, we developed a de-
tailed model of the corn market for 
the 2008 crop. The model refl ects 
the March 31 USDA acreage report 
that pegged prospective corn acre-
age at 86 million acres. The model 
also includes how further increases 
in ethanol production capacity will 
affect prices as well as the impact 
on the percentage of this capacity 
that will actually be used for pro-
duction given corn prices, ethanol 
prices, and the price of distillers 
grains. Demand equations for corn 
used as feed, food, and exports are 
all accounted for also. Details about 
the model are given in our paper 
“Ethanol, Mandates, and Drought: 
Insights from a Stochastic Equilib-
rium Model of the U.S. Corn Mar-
ket” (available at http://www.card.
iastate.edu/publications/). This 
model is in the process of being 
expanded to include soybeans and 
wheat and to include three years 
of projections. But for now, it only 
includes corn and price projections 
for the 2008 crop year. 
Projecting 2008 Corn Prices
The model is a “Groundhog Day” 
(the movie) model because we re-
peat the 2008 marketing year many 
times. One difference with the movie 
is that we allow the important fac-
tors that will affect the price of corn 
to vary according to what market 
traders believe will happen in the 
future or what history suggests will 
happen. The factors that we treat as 
being unknowable at this time (early 
April) are planted acreage, acres not 
harvested for grain, corn yield, the 
price of gasoline (which determines 
the price of ethanol), export de-
mand, and the capacity of the etha-
nol industry. We treat as known the 
level of feed demand (given a price 
of corn), the level of the demand for 
corn by the food industry, and how 
stock levels will vary for different 
corn prices. To the extent possible, 
we calibrate the model to USDA data 
put together in the World Agricul-
tural Supply and Demand Estimates 
(WASDE). 
For each repeat of the 2008 crop 
and marketing year, a random draw 
(as in a card draw) of each of the 
unknowable factors is obtained by 
the computer. For each combination 
of the random draws, we have the 
computer solve for the price of corn 
so that demand equals supply. We 
simulate the corn market for 1,000 
years, recording the market-clearing 
corn price each time. We take the 
average of the 1,000 prices as the 
“expected” corn price and we mea-
sure the variability of corn prices 
by taking the standard deviation of 
the 1,000 prices. This procedure is 
aptly named a Monte Carlo simula-
tion model. In technical terms, it is 
called a partial equilibrium stochas-
tic model of the corn market.
Model Results
We ran the model under a number 
of different scenarios, including a 
“base” scenario in which we as-
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sumed that current ethanol man-
dates, tax credits, and import 
tariffs are maintained and that we 
have no information about 2008 
growing conditions other than 
what we have observed in the past. 
Gasoline price levels and price 
variability were taken from the 
New York Mercantile Exchange 
gasoline futures and options 
markets. Our baseline corn price 
distribution has a mean (the ex-
pected price) of $5.60 per bushel. 
This price represents the aver-
age price to be received by corn 
farmers for their 2008 crop (not 
the harvest price or any particu-
lar month’s futures price). Taking 
into account the variability in the 
“unknowables,” our estimate of the 
price volatility is 19 percent, which 
means that we have a 70 percent 
chance that the actual price will 
fall between $4.53 and $6.66. 
These results suggest that there is 
quite a small probability that corn 
prices will fall to levels that would 
satisfy the livestock industry. 
Our baseline results indicate that 
there is a 20 percent chance that 
the $0.51-per-gallon tax credit is 
insuffi cient to make ethanol plants 
willing to produce mandated etha-
nol levels. This means that there 
is a reasonably high chance that 
ethanol prices will have to be bid 
above levels that would otherwise 
clear the ethanol market. 
High corn prices have in-
creased speculation that scheduled 
ethanol mandates will be relaxed. A 
relaxation of mandates would have 
little impact on the ethanol indus-
try’s capacity unless some plants 
currently under construction are 
mothballed. The 2008 crop-year 
impacts of eliminating the mandate 
are modest. We estimate that such 
a policy change would decrease the 
expected corn price by only $0.26 
per bushel to $5.34 per bushel. The 
corn price volatility decreases to 
17 percent because corn prices are 
not bid up as strongly without a 
mandate in short-crop years.
Removal of both the mandate 
and the $0.51 tax credit would be ex-
pected to have a much larger impact 
on corn prices because the ethanol 
industry’s ability to pay for corn 
would decrease substantially. Howev-
er, the extent to which ethanol prices 
would fall depends on gasoline prices 
and on the willingness of blenders to 
pay for reduced volumes of ethanol. 
Under this scenario, we estimate that 
ethanol production would decrease 
by about 30 percent from baseline 
levels, the expected ethanol price 
would decrease from $2.39 per gallon 
to $1.96 per gallon, and the expected 
corn price would drop from $5.60 to 
$4.83. The impacts of eliminating the 
mandate and the tax credit are not as 
great as one might expect because 
the ethanol industry would continue 
to operate until processing margins 
turn negative. The corn price im-
pacts would be greater if the tariff on 
imported Brazilian ethanol were also 
eliminated.
The fi nal situation we examined 
is what would happen to corn prices 
if we had a return of a 1988-style 
drought when corn yields were al-
most 25 percent below trend levels. 
Keeping the mandate in place would 
have a large impact on corn and 
ethanol prices. The expected price 
of corn would increase to $8.62 per 
bushel—54 percent above baseline 
levels—while the expected price of 
ethanol would have to be bid up to 
$3.30 per gallon to induce ethanol 
producers to meet mandated con-
sumption levels. This price of etha-
nol means that total ethanol subsi-
dies under these drought conditions 
would average $1.50 per gallon, for a 
one-year total subsidy of $15 billion. 
Relaxing the mandate, the expected 
price of corn in this type of drought 
condition would still increase to 
$7.28 per bushel. The ethanol in-
dustry would be working at less 
than half of its capacity, with a total 
ethanol supply of about 5.2 billion 
gallons, which is adequate to meet 
oxygenate requirements and clean 
air mandates.
Future Modeling Efforts
The scenario results discussed here 
show the policy value of construct-
ing this type of model. The model-
ing results suggest that there would 
be little relief from high corn prices 
in the short run even if U.S. etha-
nol mandates and subsidies were 
relaxed. The existence of ethanol 
plants should keep corn prices high 
for the next year or two even under 
lower ethanol subsidies. As other 
countries respond to high crop 
prices with expanded production, 
we should expect to see a greater 
decline in corn prices over time 
with a change in ethanol policy. 
Over the next six months to a 
year, CARD researchers will be de-
veloping a more realistic Monte Car-
lo model of the U.S. crop sector to 
capture more precisely the impacts 
on soybeans and wheat as well as 
corn from a change in U.S. ethanol 
policy. Expect to see economics lin-
go such as “dynamic, multi-market, 
rational expectations equilibrium” 
in the near future as we develop 
models to capture the interplay of 
energy and crop markets and the 
consequences of biofuels policies 
on commodity prices. ◆
The modeling results 
suggest that there would 
be little relief from high 
corn prices in the short 
run even if U.S. ethanol 
mandates and subsidies 
were relaxed. 
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Record crop prices are sig-naling the world’s farmers to produce more. The re-
cent prospective acreage report 
released by the USDA shows that 
the ability of U.S. farmers to grow 
more is limited by a lack of land. 
The USDA projects that acreage 
planted to crops in the United 
States will increase by about 1 
percent in 2008 relative to 2007 
acreage and about 2.5 percent 
relative to 2006 acreage. This 
lack of a supply response by U.S. 
farmers shows how insensitive ag-
gregate U.S. planted acreage is to 
price changes, at least in the short 
run. It explains why introducing 
a major new demand for agricul-
tural output in the form of biofuels 
should be expected to have such a 
large impact on commodity prices.
The only way that crop pric-
es will return to lower levels is 
through an expansion in aggre-
gate supply. This expansion can 
come from two sources: expansion 
in land planted to crops in other 
countries and conversion of land 
in the Conservation Reserve Pro-
gram (CRP) in the United States. 
Brazil, Argentina, Africa, and Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe all have 
land resources that are not cur-
rently planted or that could gener-
ate substantially more production. 
We should expect production in 
these areas over the next two to 
fi ve years to increase sharply. 
At current prices and current 
CRP rental rates, a large propor-
tion of CRP land will be taken 
out of the program as contracts 
expire for the simple reason that 
Options for the Conservation Reserve Program
the returns from crop production 
are now higher than the returns 
that can be obtained from the 
program on most CRP land. In one 
sense, this is how the program is 
supposed to work. When the CRP 
began in 1986, crop prices were so 
low that Congress was desperate 
for any means to reduce supply. 
In addition, the farm crisis was in 
full swing in 1986. CRP rental rates 
acted as a stabilization program 
that created a fl oor on land prices. 
Today, with record high crop and 
land prices, there is no reason to 
use CRP to control supply. Thus, 
the decision to bring CRP land 
back into production would seem 
to serve the public’s interest.
However, most CRP land today 
provides more than supply con-
trol. It also provides a wide array 
of environmental services, includ-
ing critical wildlife habitat, reduc-
tion in nutrient and sediment loads 
in rivers and lakes, and carbon 
sequestration benefi ts. The transi-
tion of CRP from a supply control 
program to an environmental pro-
gram began in the early 1990s and 
continues today. Consequently, the 
public interest in seeing lower crop 
prices needs to be weighed against 
the public interest in maintaining 
the substantial environmental ben-
efi ts of land in CRP. 
Current CRP Policy
If CRP policy remains unchanged, 
perhaps two million acres of CRP 
land per year will be brought back 
into crop production over the next 
10 years as contracts expire. This 
would reduce the size of the pro-
gram from today’s 34 million acres 
to less than 15 million acres. The 
resulting expansion in planted acre-
age will have a noticeable impact 
on aggregate supply because 20 mil-
lion acres represents an increase 
of about 6 percent of 2008 total 
planted acreage. 
In addition to this steady in-
crease in acreage as contracts 
expire, a substantial number of 
landowners will likely decide to 
pay the penalty to break their CRP 
contracts. The current penalty for 
breaking a CRP contract is to pay 
back all amounts that have been 
paid under the contract, includ-
ing annual rental payments and 
cost share amounts, as well as a 
25 percent penalty on one year’s 
rental payment and interest costs 
on the monies paid. For most farm-
ers, these stiff penalties mean that it 
makes no sense to break the con-
tracts. However, for newly signed 
contracts, the penalties are nonex-
istent or small because large pay-
ments have not yet been made. 
In 2006, the USDA moved to re-
enroll or extend many of the con-
tracts that would expire between 
2007 and 2010. During that period, 
CRP contracts for nearly 28 million 
acres were scheduled to expire—
over half of them in 2007. The re-
enrollment and extension program 
(known as REX) was successful in 
re-signing over 23 million acres, in 
part because crop prices had not 
yet signifi cantly increased. Figure 1 
shows the change in possible CRP 
expirations from REX. Under REX, 
acreage was categorized with an 
environmental benefi t index. Owners 
of the most environmentally sensi-
. . . the public interest in 
seeing lower crop prices 
needs to be weighed 
against the public interest 
in maintaining the 
substantial environmental 
benefi ts of land in CRP. 
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tive 20 percent of eligible acreage 
were offered new 10- or 15-year CRP 
contracts; the next most sensitive 20 
percent were offered 5-year exten-
sions of their current contracts, then 
the next, 4-year extensions, and so 
on. This structure made sense at the 
time because it locked up the more 
environmentally sensitive land under 
new, longer-term contracts and al-
lowed less environmentally sensitive 
lands to ease back into production 
over a fi ve-year period. However, 
REX sign-up has created an unintend-
ed situation:  the penalty for break-
ing CRP contracts is smaller for the 
more environmentally sensitive land 
than it is for less environmentally 
sensitive land because having a new 
contract greatly reduces the penalty. 
This suggests that the USDA might 
want to consider some possible new 
strategies for the CRP.
Options for the CRP 
USDA has not yet indicated wheth-
er a change in CRP rules is being 
planned for this summer. Livestock 
groups favor reducing or eliminat-
ing early-out penalties for CRP to 
maximize the amount of land that is 
cropped. Environmental groups want 
current rules enforced. If nothing is 
done then, as Figure 1 shows, signifi -
cant expiration of CRP contracts will 
not occur until the fall of 2009. This 
means that much of this land cannot 
be planted until the 2010 crop year. 
If crop prices remain high, and the 
USDA does not signifi cantly increase 
CRP rental rates, then a signifi cant 
portion of this land will be brought 
back into production. But relief from 
high crop prices will not come until 
the 2010 crop is harvested. Because 
a signifi cant portion of this land is 
likely going to come of CRP anyway, 
it might make sense for the USDA 
to eliminate penalties on contracts 
that expire in the next three years 
in order to get productive land 
back into production earlier. Bring-
ing back some land into production 
would free up funds for the USDA to 
increase bids on the most environ-
mentally sensitive land that offers 
the greatest environmental benefi ts. 
This proactive policy change could 
preserve the most environmentally 
sensitive land in CRP while allowing 
land that is perhaps needed to grow 
crops to come back into production. 
One drawback of focusing only 
on contracts that expire in the next 
few years is that this would do noth-
ing to keep farmers who just signed 
new contracts under the REX pro-
gram from bringing their land back 
into production. After all, it probably 
makes fi nancial sense for a signifi -
cant number of these farmers to pay 
the relatively small penalty on the 
new contracts and bring their land 
into production. One option that the 
USDA could take would be to rebid 
their entire portfolio of CRP con-
tracts. This would allow the agency 
to concentrate its payments on keep-
ing the most vulnerable land out of 
production—which would require 
signifi cantly higher per-acre rental 
payments—while allowing land 
that is not especially vulnerable to 
be farmed in the 2009 season. This 
would meet the objectives of live-
stock feeders and others who want 
an expanded supply soon while 
simultaneously keeping the most vul-
nerable land out of production. A sen-
sible approach to defi ning what land 
should remain in CRP would be for 
state offi ces to designate conserva-
tion priorities and then to seek land 
within their boundaries that most ef-
fectively meets their objectives. The 
length of the offered CRP contracts 
could be staggered so that not all 
contracts come due in the same year. 
Changing CRP contract rules 
might create its own problems, 
however. The perception that the 
USDA “gave in” to political pres-
sure from livestock and other 
crop user groups might weaken its 
future credibility when it enters 
into contracts. But there are sound 
reasons to believe that changing 
the rules is, in fact, justifi ed. For 
the fi rst time, agriculture is being 
asked to supply both food and fuel. 
Having to meet both demands with 
more than 30 million acres of land 
being held in reserve is diffi cult to 
rationalize. Most people recognize 
that the last two years have led to 
unprecedented changes in agricul-
ture. Choosing to “re-optimize” CRP 
through a combination of penalty 
elimination and aggressive rebid-
ding might be viewed as simply a 
refl ection of this reality, rather than 
a sign of political weakness. ◆
Figure 1. Projected Conservation Reserve Program acres, before and after 
the re-enrollment and extension program








The USDA projects U.S. corn exports to be a record 2.45 billion bushels for the 2007/08 
marketing year. Soybean exports 
are projected to take up nearly 40 
percent of the 2007 U.S. soybean 
crop, up from 35 percent the year 
before. This export boom has oc-
curred in spite of signifi cantly higher 
crop prices. Corn prices averaged 
$3.04 per bushel for the 2006 crop; 
they are projected to average about 
$4 per bushel for the 2007 crop. 
The price movements for soybeans 
have been even more dramatic, 
with roughly a $4-per-bushel gain in 
prices over the past year. One of the 
major factors behind the strength of 
these crops is the weakness of the 
U.S. dollar.
Exchange Rate Movements
The dollar has been weakening rela-
tive to many countries’ currencies 
over the past year and a half. Not 
coincidentally, this period of dollar 
weakness overlaps with the period of 
higher crop prices. The combination 
has been good news for U.S. crop 
producers. Normally, higher crop 
prices lead to lower crop exports, but 
the weak dollar has offset that impact 
and made U.S. crops attractive to 
international buyers. The relative 
value of one currency versus another 
is called the exchange rate. U.S. ex-
change rates with most of the rest of 
the world have been falling, mean-
ing you can exchange one dollar for 
fewer units of other world currencies. 
Figure 1 shows the relative exchange 
rates (setting the January 2007 value 
equal to 1) versus the currencies of 
several of our major trading partners. 
As you can see from the fi gure, by 
the end of 2007 the U.S. dollar lost 
ground versus all of these curren-
cies. For Mexico and South Korea, 
the change was small, less than 1 
percent. But for countries such as 
Canada and Japan, the exchange rate 
shift was quite large. And this shift 
made U.S. commodities look relative-
ly more affordable.
Canada is one example of this 
effect. In January 2007, 1 U.S. dol-
lar was worth 1.176 Canadian dol-
lars. By December, the exchange 
rate had fallen to near parity. Using 
these exchange rates, the U.S. corn 
price of $3.05 per bushel for January 
2007 translated into $3.59 Canadian. 
The December 2007 U.S. corn price 
of $3.76 per bushel translated into 
$3.77 Canadian. Over the course of 
2007, U.S. corn prices increased $0.71 
per bushel, but this increase only 
translated into an 18¢ increase for 
Canadian customers. This highlights 
the impact exchange rate changes 
can have on relative prices between 
countries. Figure 2 shows the relative 
price of corn (January 2007 = 1) for 
the United States and Canada. U.S. 
corn was actually cheaper in Canada 
from July to November than it was in 
January 2007. Overall, since January 
2007, the United States has experi-
enced a nearly 60 percent increase in 
corn prices, while Canada’s increase 
has been roughly 35 percent.
And as the right half of Figure 
1 shows, the dollar is expected to 
remain weak for the rest of 2008. The 
projections are from the Internation-
al Monetary Fund and the Federal Re-
serve Board, through the USDA. The 
U.S. dollar is projected to continue to 
decline versus the Japanese yen and 
the Taiwanese dollar, hold steady 
against the Canadian dollar and the 
Mexican peso, and strengthen versus 
the South Korean won. Overall, the 
exchange rate projections, when 
weighted by total U.S. trade, show 
the dollar declining roughly 7 per-
cent over 2008. If the weighting is 
based on only agricultural trade, the 
decline is 8 percent.
Weakness Can Be a Strength
But this is only half of the story in 
how exchange rates are affecting 
U.S. trade. Our trade competitive-
ness depends on how the dollar 
stacks up against our trade competi-
tors’ currencies. A weaker dollar 
means our goods look relatively less 
expensive than the same goods from 
our competitors. Figure 3 shows 
the movement of the U.S. dollar 
versus the currencies of several of 
our trade competitors. In 2007, the 
dollar generally weakened against 
the currencies of our trade competi-
tors. The biggest drop was versus 
Brazil, at over 17 percent, but the 
dollar also declined versus the euro 
(10 percent) and the Chinese yuan 
(5 percent). The dollar strengthened 
relative to the Argentine peso. For 
2008, those trends are expected to 
continue. The dollar is projected to 
be fl at against the Argentine peso 
but to fall by roughly 12 percent ver-
sus the real, the euro, and the yuan. 
These trends bode well for U.S. ag-
ricultural exports. In fact, averaging 
over all U.S. agricultural trade, the 
dollar is projected to decline by 9 
percent over 2008.
The weak dollar also means that 
the price signals seen by our farm-
ers are muted to international pro-
ducers. Using Brazil as an example, 
Figure 4 shows relative soybean 
prices (January 2007 = 1) for the 
United States and Brazil. U.S. pro-
ducers have seen soybean prices 
increase by nearly 90 percent since 
January 2007. Brazilian producers 
have seen prices increase for their 
soybeans, but not nearly as strong-
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ly, and most of the increase has 
been in the last two months. So the 
international production reaction to 
higher U.S. prices is diminished as 
the dollar weakens. For both corn 
and soybeans, the international 
production response has thus far 
been small. For corn, the 2007/08 
production response amounted to 
less than a 1 percent production 
increase, mostly coming from Brazil 
and South Africa. For soybeans, 
production actually fell slightly, with 
only Brazil showing a slight uptick 
in production. In the longer term, we 
should expect to see a larger inter-
national response to the high U.S. 
crop prices we see today, but the 
weak dollar is currently mitigating 
some of that response. ◆
Figure 1. The relative weakness of the U.S. dollar for 
our trade partners (Jan. 2007 = 1)
Figure 2. Relative corn prices for the United States 
and Canada (Jan. 2007 = 1)
Figure 3. The relative weakness of the U.S. dollar for 
our trade competitors (Jan. 2007 = 1)
Figure 4. Relative soybean prices for the United States 
and Brazil (Jan. 2007 = 1)





Crop farmers are enjoying re-cord high profi ts because of dramatically higher market 
prices. Farmers’ increased demand 
for land, seed, fertilizer, and machin-
ery has resulted in higher prices and 
profi ts for sellers of these inputs as 
well. One industry that is also enjoy-
ing the higher crop prices is the crop 
insurance industry. It benefi ts from 
higher prices because the formulas 
used to determine industry revenue 
automatically generate higher expect-
ed subsidies as crop prices rise. Ac-
tual subsidies depend in part on crop 
losses, but administrative and oper-
ating subsidies are directly tied to 
crop prices. Figure 1 shows how total 
industry revenues from insuring the 
nation’s corn, soybean, wheat, and 
cotton farmers have risen in recent 
years. Revenues could rise by another 
25 percent in 2008 if crop losses are 
similar to those in 2007.
You might think that the formulas 
used to subsidize the industry would 
be tied to industry workload or ef-
fort rather than crop prices. After all, 
rarely are government-paid salaries 
tied directly to a commodity price. 
But as shown in Figure 2, the number 
of corn, soybean, wheat, and cotton 
policies written since 2000 has been 
fl at. That is, agent and company work-
loads since 2000 for these four crops 
have not increased, yet agent commis-
sions over this time have increased 
by a factor of four.
The salaries of crop insurance 
company employees and claims 
adjustors are largely determined by 
market forces. After all, why should 
the salary of a crop insurance com-
pany vice president or computer pro-
grammer be any higher than needed 
to keep that employee in the job? A 
recent report sponsored by National 
Boom Times for Crop Insurance
Figure 1. Total crop industry revenue from corn, soybeans, wheat, and 
cotton since 2000
Figure 2. Policies serviced for four crops and associated total agent 
commissions
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to generate reserves to cover years 
with negative underwriting gains. 
However, farmers in the Corn Belt 
are beginning to wonder whether 
crop insurance is such a good deal 
for them. Why should they be asked 
year after year to generate large un-
derwriting gains so that the indus-
try will be willing to offer insurance 
in other states? Why should they 
keep generating excessive annual 
agent commissions when they rare-
ly receive payments that exceed 
their premiums? Since 2000, agent 
commissions on policies sold to 
corn and soybean farmers in Iowa, 
Illinois, and Indiana have totaled 
more than $933 million, whereas 
corn and soybean farmers in these 
three states have paid $768 million 
more in premiums than they have 
collected in indemnities.
The initial push in early 2007 by 
the National Corn Growers Associa-
tion to include a county revenue coun-
tercyclical program in the new farm 
bill refl ected a belief by corn farmers 
that a reduction in the role of the crop 
insurance industry as a risk-manage-
ment middleman would better serve 
both farmers and taxpayers. Their 
county program was immediately op-
posed by the crop insurance industry 
because it would have dramatically 
increased the proportion of taxpayer 
support for risk management that 
would have fl owed directly to farm-
ers. Given the results of the analysis 
shared here, it is clear why their pro-
posal was also attacked by politicians 
and commodity groups from Great 
Plains states: reducing participation 
in crop insurance by Corn Belt farm-
ers would dramatically reduce indus-
try profi ts, which would threaten the 
willingness of companies to insure 
farmers in states where premiums 
have not kept pace with losses.
It’s possible that an optional 
state-level revenue countercyclical 
program will emerge in the new farm 
bill. However, it would not be surpris-
ing if those farmers who opt for this 
policy will be required to purchase 
crop insurance. Such a requirement 
would refl ect the infl uence of indus-
try interests that are aligned with 
regional interests in maintaining, 
for as long as possible, the current 
structure of the program. ◆ 
Note of Disclosure: The author has 
worked as a consultant for the National 
Corn Growers Association estimating the 
cost of various farm bill alternatives.
Corn Belt Contributions to the Crop 
Insurance Industry
Continued from page 3
Figure 3. Agent commission per corn, soybean, wheat, and cotton         
policy sold
Crop Insurance Services shows that 
all cost categories but one have large-
ly tracked with general labor markets. 
The one exception is agent commis-
sions, which track directly with crop 
prices and premiums in the program. 
As shown in Figure 3, this means that 
the commission per written policy 
has increased from $351 per policy 
in 2000 to an estimated $1,357 per 
policy in 2008. The reason for this rise 
in agent commissions is that under 
crop insurance rules, companies can-
not compete on the prices of policies 
because these are set by the govern-
ment. The only way for companies 
to compete with each other is to vie 
for agents’ policies. This competition 
results in changes in taxpayer subsi-
dies being directly refl ected in agent 
commissions.  ◆
Note: Policy numbers are calculated 
from data obtained from the RMA Sum-
mary of Business Reports. Commissions 
are calculated from “Federal Crop Insur-
ance Program Profi tability and Effective-
ness Analysis, 2007 Update,” prepared 
on behalf of the National Crop Insurance 
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